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A COMPARISON OF CHANGES
IN THESTRUCTUREOF WAGES
IN FOUR OECD COUNTRJES
ABSTRACT
Thispaper compares changes in the structure of wages in France, Great Britain, Japan,
and the United States over the last twenty years. Wage differentials by education and occupation
(skill differentials) narrowed substantially in all four countries in the 1970s. Overall wage
inequality and skill differentials expanded dramatically in Great Britain and the United States and
moderately in Japan during the 1980s. In contrast, wage inequality did not increase much in
France through the mid-1980s. Industrial and occupational shifts favored mom-educated workers
in all four countries throughout the last twenty years. Reductions in the rate of the growth of
the relative supply of college-educated workers in the face of persistent increases in the relative
demand for more-skilled labor can explain a substantial portion of the increase in educational
wage differentials in the United States, Britain, arid Japan in the 1980s. Sharp increases in the
national minimum wage (the SMIC)and the abilityof French unions to extend contracts even
in theface of decliningmembership helped prevent wage differentials from expanding in France
through themid-1980s.
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In the 1 970s, the relative earnings advantage of highly-educated workers, particularly
recent or young university graduates, deteriorated in the United States and most other OECD
nations Freeman, 1981). This decline coincided with a pattern of decreasing wage differentials
by occupation throughout much of the developed world. The narrowing of skill differentials in
the 1 970s appears to have been strongly related to dramatic increases in the relative supply of
highly-educated workers generated by the labor force entrance of baby-boom cohorts and the
rapid expansion of higher education. Explicit governmental and trade union policies aimed at
reducing earnings differentials are also likely to have been an important factor in many countries.
In contrast to the experience of the 1970s, wage differentials by education and occupation
expanded dramatically in the United States in the 1980s.' Over the past ten years, the U.S.
wage structure also changed substantially along several other dimensions: differentials by
experience rose for less-educated workers, earnings inequality within education-experience-
gender groups increased, and gender differentials narrowed. These changes generated a large
increase in overall wage inequality among both men and women and led to a particularly sharp
deterioration in the relative earnings of young, less-educated men.
Many explanations have been offered for recent U.S. wage structure developments. One
class of explanations argues that rising education differentials and narrowing gender differentials
reflect shifts in the relative demand for labor favoring "more-skilled over less-skilleW' workers
and possibly women over men. Candidates for shifts in demand favoring more-skilled workers
include technological changes associated with the spread of computers and computer-based
technology that reduce the demand for physical labor and increase the demand for workers able
to learn at least cost (8erman, 8ound, and Griliches, 1992; Krueger, 1993; and Mincer, 1991);
the loss of manufacturing jobs offering relatively high pay to less-educated workers; and the
transfer of jobs requiring relatively routinized tasks to low-wage countries (Reich, 1991). Other
'See, for example, Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992), and Murphy and Welch
(1992).2
explanations focus on changes in wage-setting institutions such as the declining influence of
unions (Freeman. 1991). the erosion of the real value of the minimum wage (Blackburn, Bloom,
and Freeman, 1990), and changes in pay-setting norms.
Much research attempting to evaluate these alternative explanations for changes in the
U.S. wage structure in the 1980s (e.g. Bound and Johnson, 1992; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce,
1989; and Katz and Murphy, 1992) has attempted to exploit U.S. time series information by
essentially comparing the experience of the 1 960s with the experiences of the I 970s and the
1960s. Katz and Murphy (1992) conclude that any consistent explanation of U.S. wage
structure changes since the late 1960s requires a rapid secular growth in the demand for
"more-skille& workers.
U.S. time series information alone is probably insufficient to sharply distinguish among
competing explanations for recent wage structure changes. A complementary approach is to
collect comparable time series data for several countries on wage structure changes and on
measures of changes in supply and demand for different labor inputs. Changes in wage
structures across countries not accounted for by demand and supply shifts constitute a residual
category that may be the result of a variety of factors. In particular, an examination of labor
market institutions (e.g.. minimum wages) may play an important role in understanding
differences in the evolution of relative wages across countries.2
-
In this paper, we assemble roughly comparable time series of data on changes in the
structure of wages in the United States, Britain, Japan, and France. These four countries
provide useful contrasts since they include two countries with decentralized wage setting
institutions (the United States and Britain), one representative of the relatively centralized wage
setting systems characteristic of Continental Europe (France). and a high-growth economy with
strong trade performance (Japan). We examine supply and demand and institutional
2Recent studies exploiting broad cross-country comparisons to examine alternative hypotheses for
changing wage structures Davis (1992) and Gottschalk and Joyce (1992).3
explanations for the differences in wage structure changes among these countries.
Our major findings concerning similarities and differences among these four countries in
patterns of changes in relative wages can be summarized as follows:
1. Trends in Overall Waqe Inequality by Sex: All four countries share a pattern of rising
wage inequality among both men and women in the 1 980s, but the magnitudes of the increases
differ substantially. Great Britain and the United States both displayed dramatic increases in
wage inequality during the 1 980s, while the increase in Japan was much more moderate.
France experienced declining inequality until 1984 and a moderate increase from 1984 to 1987.
2. Chanqes in Education/Occupation Differentials: Educational and nonmanual/manual
wage differentials narrowed in all four countries in the 1 970s. The college wage premium and
nonmanual/manual differentials expanded dramatically in the United States and Britain in the
1980s and moderately in Japan. Occupational differentials continued to narrow in France in the
19805 with a hint of a slight upturn for males after 1985.
3. Within Group Inequality: Wage inequality among those with similar education and
experience increased for both men and women in the United States and Britain in the 1 980s.
Within group (residual) inequality has been rising since the late 1 960s in the United States. In
contrast, within group inequality narrowed in the 1 970s in France and Britain.
We find that simple supply and demand measures go a reasonable distance towards
explaining the differences and similarities among these countries in patterns of relative wage
movements. Relative labor demand appears to have been rapidly shifting in favor of more-
educated workers in OECD countries throughout the past twenty years. But the relative supply
of college-educated workers grew rapidly enough to drive down skill differentials in all four of
our countries during the 1 970s. The pace of growth of the relative supply of highly-educated
workers decelerated substantially in the 1 980s in the United States, Britain, and Japan, and each
of these experienced rising college wage premiums in the 1 980s. An acceleration in the pace
of industrial shifts in employment away from sectors that disproportionately employ male manual4
workers also appears to be an important part of the reason for the tremendous increase in skill
differentials in Britain in the 1 980s.
Institutional differences across the countries translated the relative demand shifts against
less-educated workers into similar outcomes of sharply rising inequality in the United States and
Britain in the 1 980s, but a very different outcome in France through the mid-i 980s. In France,
a high and pervasive minimum wage and contract extensions prevented the relative wages of
the unskilled from falling significantly, despite substantial employment declines. The French
experience appears to be consistent with the evidence from other continental European
countries, such as Germany and Italy, where significant relative demand shifts did not result in
large increases in wage differentials through the mid-1980s (Abraham and Houseman, 1992;
Erickson and Ichino, 1992). Finally, the strength of the Japanese manufacturing sector may
partially account for the much smaller magnitude of changes in skill differentials in Japan than
in Britain and the United States during the 1980s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section Il contrasts changes in overall
wage inequality in these four countries over the last twenty-five years. Section III presents more
detailed evidence on changes in the structure of wages in the four countries. Section IV
provides supply and demand measures for each country and examines their contribution to
changes in the wage structures of the four countries. Section V provides a speculative
discussion of the role played by labor market institutions in explaining the movements inwage
differentials not accounted for by demand and supply effects. Section VI concludes.
II. Changes in Overall Wane lneoualitv
We begin by contrasting overall movements in wage inequality in France, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.3 Figure 1 summarizes movements in wage inequality
3A summary of aggregate labor market developments from 1965 to 1989 in the four countries is





























































































































































































































































































































































































































by sex for full-time workers.' The figure plots the time-series of overall wage inequality for
each group as measured by the log wage differential between the 90th and 10th percentiles of
the wage distribution for that group. The figure shows large increases in wage inequality in the
1 980s in the United States and Britain, a moderate increase in Japan, and small increase in
France starting in 1984. Panel A of Figure 1 indicates that the 90-10 log wage differential for
U.S. males increased substantially in the 1 970s (from 1.15 in 1969 to 1.30 in 1979) and even
more rapidly in the 1980s (increasing by 0.19 from 1979 to 1989). Wage inequality for U.S.
females remained stable in the 1 970s and then expanded dramatically in the 1 980s. The figure
illustrates a strong similarity in the pattern of sharply rising inequality in the United Kingdom and
the United States in the 1 980s. In contrast to the U.S. experience, earnings inequality actually
narrowed substantially in Britain in the 1 970s. Panel C shows that the 90-10 log wage
differentials for both men and women narrowed in France from 1967 to 1984 and then show
a moderate increase from 1984 to 1987. Finally panel D indicates a gradual increase in the 90-
10 log wage differential of 0.11 for men and of 0.07 for women from 1976 to 1990 in Japan.
France is the only one of the countries that shows no evidence of rising wage inequality
in the early I 980s. But increases in inequality from 1984 to 1987 suggest that France may be
experiencing relative demand shifts against the less-skilled similar to those in the United States.
Frances delayed and muted changes in wage structure may reflect labor market institutions that
4Detailed information on the sources, earnings concepts, and sample selection criteria of all the data
sets used to measure wage structure changes in this paper is presented in the data appendix. The
wage inequality measures in Figure 1 refer to the following earnings concepts and samples: (1) United
States: hourly wages (annual earnings divided by the product of weeks worked and usual weekly
hours) for full-time workers, 18-64 years old, using data from the Annual Demographic Supplements
to the March Current Populations Surveys; (2) Britain: gross hourly earnings for full-time workers from
the New Earnings Survey; (3) France: gross annual earnings adjusted for hours differences for full-time.
full-year workers from Declarations Annuelles de Salaires; and (4) Japan: monthly scheduled earnings
for regular workers from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure.
5We do not present estimates of the 90-10 differential for women prior to 1975. because of
changes in CPS between the March 1975 and 1976 surveys. We use imputation procedures for weeks
and hours worked for the survey years prior to 1976 developed by Kevin M. Murphy that have been
calibrated to fit hours and weeks worked distributions for men and not for women. Thus we are
skeptical of hourly earnings distribution estimates for women prior to 1975.6
make it difficult to expand skill differentials, A system of minimum wages and contract
extensions in France means unions can have a large impact on wages even with low union
density. Smaller increases in wage inequality in Japan than in the United States and Britain may
reflect the stability of the Japan's manufacturing employment share during the 1 980s.
How did the changes in relative earnings documented in Figure 1 translate into changes
in real earnings? Figure 2 tries to answer this question by the plotting cumulative log real wage
growth of the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the wage distributions for men in each
country. More precisely, the figure displays the log ratio of each group's real earnings in each
year relative to that group's level of real earnings in 1979 (the base year). Panels A and B show
the similar widening of the 90-10 differential in the 1 980s in Britain and the United States, but
indicate that this widening implied a 10 percent real wage decline from 1979-89 at the 10th
percentile in the U.S. wage distribution and a 10 percent real wage increase at the same point
of the British distribution. Real earnings growth was rapid throughout the earnings distribution
in France in the I 960s and 1970s and much more gradual in the 1 980s. Panel D shows that
real wages have grown rapidly for all groups in Japan over the last 15 years.
In summary, earnings inequality has increased greatly over the last twenty years in Britain
and the United States and fairly moderately in Japan. Over the same period, wage inequality
has not changed much for males and has been substantially reduced for women in France.
Ill. Wage Structure Changes in Four Countries
In this section, we turn to a more detailed examination of the patterns of relative wage
changes that underlie trends in overall wage inequality in the United States, Britain, Japan, and
France. We first separately examine the four countries using the best data available to illustrate
each country's wage structure changes. We then summarize the major differences and






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A. Changes in the Structure of Wages in the United States
We examine U.S. wage structure changes over the 1967 to 1991 period. Figure 3
summarizes relative wage changes for the 1967 to 1989 period using data from all twenty-three
Annual Oemographic Supplements to the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for survey
years 1968 to 1990. The wage measure is hourly earnings computed as annual earnings divided
by annual hours (annual weeks worked times usual weekly hours). Table 1 provides information
on real earnings levels and changes in real and relative earnings by sex-education-experience
groups for the 1979 to 1991 period using data from all twelve months of the CPS outgoing
rotation groups (OROs) for 1979, 1987, and 1991. The wage concept used in Table 1 is the
hourly wage measured as usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours, The wage
samples used in the figure and the table consist of full-time workers (defined as those that
usually work 35 or more hours per week).
Panel A of Figure 3 documents movements in the college/high school log wage ratio for
ail males (those with 1 to 40 years of potential experience) and for new entrants (those with 1
to 5 years of potential experience). The time-series of college returns for all males is the fixed-
weighted average of the college/high school log wage ratios for workers in 40 experience groups
(with each group covering a single year experience interval). The returns for new entrants are
a fixed-weighted average of the ratios for corresponding five single-year experience groups. (The
weights used in all fixed-weighted averages presented for our U.S. data from the March CPSs
are the average shares of the groups in total weeks worked over the entire 1967-89 period.)
We use fixed-weighted averages to control for changes in the age composition of the different
education groups. The figure illustrates that the college wage premium is stable from 1967 to
1971, fell from 1971 to 1979, then rose sharply from 1979 to 1986, and remained at an
extremely high level at the end of the 1 980s. The swings in educational differentials were much
larger for new entrants than for older workers in the 1 970s and 1 980s


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estirnated mean log hourly earnings
























































































Notes: Each estimate is from a separate cross-section regression for full-time workers by sex and year
of log real hourly earnings on 10 schooling dummies (for less than 8, 9, 10, 11 • 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
and 18 or more years of schooling), a guartic in experience, interactions of all the experience terms
with three broad education level dummies (less than 12, 13-15, and 16 or more years of schooling),
two race dummies, interactions between the race dummies and the broad education level dummies,
and a metropolitan area dummy, The estimates are predicted values for white, full-time workers,
residing in a metropolitan area evaluated at the indicated education and experience levels. Earnings
levels are convened to 1991 dollars using the implicit price deflator for personal consumption
expenditures from the U.S. National Income Accounts. The data are from the CPS Outgoing Rotation
Groups for 1979, 1987, and 1991. The sample sizes in the regressions ranged from 45,140 to
69,415 observations.8
presents estimated mean log real hourly wages for men and women at four education levels and
two potential experience levels in 1979, 1987, and 1991.' These adjusted means of log hourly
earnings allow us to control for changes in observed measures of group composition in making
inferences concerning real and relative wage changes. Earnings differentials widened among
each successive education category for both young workers (those with five years of experience)
and prime age workers (those with twenty-five years of experience) in the 1 980s. These relative
wage changes in a period of negative average real wage growth for males generated a decline
in the real hourly wages of young, less-educated males of 25 percent. The earnings differentials
between young college graduates and high school graduates increased by approximately 20
percent for both men and women during the 1 980s. The pace of increase in educational wage
differentials was much slower in the 1987 to 1991 period than in the 1979 to 1987 period.
Panel B of figure 3 compares movements in the log ratio of the earnings of peak earners
Ithose with 26-35 years of experience) to new entrants for college and high-school males. The
figure shows that while experience differentials expanded for both groups from 1 967 to 1989,
the time patterns of the changes differ substantially.Experience differentials for college
graduates expanded from the early 1 970s to 1978 and since then they have declined. The gap
between wages of peak earners and new entrants for less-educated males increased sharply
from 1979 to 1987 and exhibits a minor decline at the end of the 1 990s. Table 1 shows similar
patterns extending to 1991. The 1 980s increase in experience differentials for males with
twelve or fewer years of schooling occurred in a period in which the relative supply of less-
educated new entrants was actually decreasing. The sharp decline in the earnings of less-
°Separate log hourly earnings regressions by sex for full-time workers were run in each year using
data from the CPS ORG samples. Each regression included 10 schooling dummies (for less than 8, 9,
10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 or more years of schooling), a quartic in experience, interactions
of all the experience terms with three broad education level dummies (less than 12. 13-15, and 16 or
more years of schooling), two race dummies, interactions between the race dummies and the broad
education level dummies, and a metropolitan area dummy. The estimates are predicted values for
white, full-time workers, residing in a metropolitan area evaluated at the indicated education and
experience levels. Earnings levels are convened to 1991 dollars using the implicit price deflator for
personal consumption expenditures from the U.S. National Income Accounts.9
educated young males relative to bath college-educated workers and less-educated, older
workers suggests a sharp shift in demand against less-skilled workers with the bulk of
adjustment falling on younger workers and older, less-educated workers somewhat insulated
from external labor market developments by specific human capital and internal labor markets
with seniority layoff rules.
Panel C presents changes in female/male wage log ratios for high school and college
workers.' Male/female wage differentials in the United States narrowed substantially during the
1 980s. The improvement in relative female earnings in the 1 980s was slightly greater among
high school than among college workers.
The data so far analyzed in this section refer to changes in real wages for groups
distinguished by gender, education, and experience, However, given that these factors account
for only about one-third of the differences in wages across workers, there is significant room for
relative wage changes within these categories as well. We next examine changes in the
dispersion of relative wages within our gender by experience by education categories.
Empirically we do this by looking at the distribution of residuals from regressions separate
regressions for men and women in each year of log hourly wages on a set of education level
dummies, a quartic in experience fully interacted with broad education-level dummies, race
dummies, and interactions of race dummies with broad education-level dummies,
Panel 0 of figure 3 plots the time series of the difference in the 90th and 10th percentiles
of the distributions of residuals from these regressions for men and women. The figure shows
that within-group (residuall inequality expanded enormously with the 90-10 differential in log
weekly wages expanding by 0.31 for men over 1967 to 1989 period and by 0.13 for men and
015 for women from 1979 to 1989. Residual inequality started to expand in the early 1 970s
and continued rather smoothly increasing in the 1 980s. This time pattern contrasts sharply with
'The plots are of fixed-weighted averages of the female/male wage log ratios for 40 single year
experience groups for both college and high school workers.10
the pattern for education differentials. We conclude from these differences in timing that the
general rise in within-group inequality and the rise in education premia over the 1963-87 period
are actually somewhat distinct economic phenomena. The earlier increase in within-group
inequality suggests a rise in the demand for skilr that predates the recent rise in returns to
education.
8. Changes in the Structure of Wages in Great Britain
Data that are reasonably consistent over time on wages by age, gender, occupation, and
industry for the United Kingdom are available for 1968 and for every year since 1974 from the
New Earnings Survey INES).° The NES is a sample survey of the earnings of employees in
employment in Great Britain in April of each year. While individual-level data from the NES are
not publicly available, published tabulations provide detailed cell means and information on
within-group earnings distributions for age, gender, occupation, and industry groups. We
examine earnings changes for full-time employees whose pay for the survey pay-period was not
affected by absence and use gross hourly earnings as our basic wage measure.
Figure 4 highlights major changes in relative wages in Great Britain from 1988 to 1991.
Panel A plots the nonmanual/manual log hourly wage differential for both males and females.
The time series differ from the usual manual/nonmanual differentials presented in many British
publications in that they are fixed-weighted averages of the differences in the log of the median
gross hourly wages of nonmanual and manual workers in 5 age groups for both males and
fernales. The figure shows that nonmanual/inanual differentials for men and women declined
greatly from 1 968 to 1 974, remained fairly stable from 1 974 to 1979, and then increased
sharply in the 1 980s. The fixed-weight nonmanual/manual differential increased over the 1979
'The New Earnings Survey is described in detail in UK Department of Employment (1991).
'The 5 age categories used are 21-24, 25-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59 years of age. The fixed





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to 1991 period from 0.32 to 0.46 for males and from 0.22 to 0.43 for females)°
Panel B of Figure 4 shows that experience differentials for males expanded moderately in
the second half of the 1 970s and quite substantially in the first part of the 1 980s. Similar
increases inexperience differentials are apparent for both manual and nonmanual males. Panel
C shows that gender differentials remained fairly steady from 1976 to 1987 after narrowing
dramatically under the influence of the Equal Pay Act in the early to mid-i 970s. Gender
differentials have narrowed a bit more since 1987.
Panel 0 illustrates that wage inequality within sex-age-broad occupation cells narrowed
in the 1 970s and then expanded greatly in the 1 980s. The figure plots for both men and women
the fixed-weighted average in each year of the 90-10 log hourly wage differentials of 10 age-
occupation cells.1'In fact, wage inequality increased greatly in the 1980s in Great Britain
within both detailed occupations and within detailed occupation-industry-gender cells (Katz and
Loveman, 1990).
While the NES does not provide information on the educational attainment of employees,
reasonably comparable individual-level data on earnings, demographic characteristics, and
educational attainment are available from the General Household Surveys (GHSs) since 1974.
The GHS is an annual CR5-style survey of ten to fifteen thousand households.'2 Table 2uses
the GHS data to examine the earnings of university graduates relative to individuals withno
"educational qualificationf over the 1974 to 1990 period. All British children must attend full-
time education until the age of 16, at which time a large portion of them leave school without
earning any educational qualifications. We use the earnings differential between those with
university degrees and those with no qualifications as a rough measure of the returns to higher
10See Adams, Maybury, and Smith (1988) for a detailed presentation ofchanges in wages by
occupation for males in Great Britain from 1973 to 1986.
-
'1The 10 cells for each sex involve the combination of fiveage groups (21-24, 25-29, 30-39, 40-
49, and 59-59) and two broad occupational categories (manual and nonmanual).
"See Schmitt (1992) for a detailed discussion of earnings and education data in the GHS.Table 2
Log Weekly Earnings Equations, Great Britain, 1974—1990







































































The dependent variable is log gross weekly pay before deductions. Individu-
als reported their pay the last tine they were paid as well as the period
covered by this payment. Earnings were then set on a weekly basis.
Equations include 11 month dumn,ies, 10 region dummies, year dummies, 13
qualifications dummies including degree plus a race dummy. The numbers in
parenthesesare standard errors.The sample is restricted to full—time
employees.
Source: General Rousehold Surveys, 1974—90.12
education in Britain. Tabulations for individuals aged 16 to 60 from the 1989 Labour Force
Survey a much larger household survey than the GHS that unfortunately does not have wage
data) indicate that 11 percent of employed males and 7 percent of employed females had a
university degree of equivalent qualification, while 24 percent of employed male and 31 percent
of employed females had no qualifications.
The reported university degree differentials in Table 2 are the estimated coefficients on
a university degree dummy variable in separate regressions for men and women of log gross
weekly pay before deductions on thirteen highest education qualifications dummies, ten region
dummies, a race dummy, experience, experience squared, and month dummies)' The base
education group is those with no qualifications. Thus Table 2 compares the earnings of those
with university degrees to members of this no qualifications group with same number of years
of labor market experience. Regressions are reported for pooled samples 1974-75, 1978-79,
1982-83. and 1 988-90. The estimates indicate that the university earnings premium declined
from the mid to late 1 970s and then increased in the 1 980s. The university earnings differential
shows a pattern of increase in the 1 980s that is similar to but smaller in magnitude than the
estimated increases in nonmanual/manual differentials from the NES.
In summary, between and within group wage differentials for both men and women
narrowed in Britain from the late 1 960s to the late 1970s and then expanded tremendously in
the 1 980s. Our results from the NES concerning overall and within group changes in inequality
for males are quite similar to Schn,itts (1992) findings from the GElS for 1974-88.
C. Changes in the Structure of Wanes in Japan
We use data from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure to analyze changes in the Japanese
Wage Structure. These wage data are compiled from wage surveys of non-government
"The samples for the regressions include full-time employees from 16 to 69 years old. Year
dummies are included in all the regressions.13
establishments with ten or more regular workers taken in June of each year. The published
wage statistics provide data on mean wages for regular workers by detailed sex-age-education
categories and of the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile wages of regular workers for sex-age
groups. The restriction of the sample to regular workers and the exclusion of small
establishments (those with fewer than 10 regular worker) means the Basic Survey on Wage
Structure misses a substantial fraction of the Japanese labor force. These exclusions are
probably more important for women than for men. We focus on monthly scheduled earnings as
our basic wage measure since this is the most readily available measure for education-age cells.
Katz and Revenga (1989) and Davis (1992) find that levels of inequality and wage differentials
are larger when a more comprehensive measure of earnings that includes overtime earnings and
special payments (bonuses) is used, but that trends in wage differentials are quite similar for
monthly scheduled earnings and total monthly earnings.'4
Figure 5 summarizes basic changes in the pattern of Japanese relative wages from 1967
to 1 990. Panel A graphs fixed-weighted averages of log college/high school wage ratios for
male age and experience groups.'6 The college/high school wage differential by age group
compares the earnings of persons from the same high school class who went on to attain a
degree to those who did not. The analogous differential by experience group compares the
earnings of college graduates and high school graduates that entered the labor market at the
same time. The college log wage premium for those of the same age fell moderately from by
0.07 from 0-23 in 1967 to a trough of 0.17 in 1984 and expanded slightly to 0.19 in 1990.
The college/high school wage differential by experience group is essentially fiat from 1974 to
"We have also analyzed changes in wage differentials for men over the 1967-87 period using
hourly total earnings. The patterns are quite similar to those for scheduled monthly earnings. We use
monthly earnings because we do not have hours data beyond 1987.
'6The age groups are 20-24, 25-29, 30-39. 40-49, and 50-59- The experience groups cover
workers with approximately 1-2. 3-7,8-12, 13-17, 18-22, 23-27, 28-32, and 33-37 years of potential
experience. The fixed-weights are the average share of the each age (or experience) group in total
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1990. But panel B of Figure 5 illustrates that relative earnings of college graduates did improve
markedly for new entrants from 1974 to 1990. The log difference between the starting salary
of new entrant college graduates and high school graduates increased from 0.15 in 1974 to
0.26 in 1990. The shortage of young workers in Japan since the early 1 970s does seen to have
created pressures in the labor market favoring young college graduates in the new entrant labor
market. This finding is not surprising given the immobility of workers in Japan once they have
entered the internal labor market of firms of at least moderate size.
Panel C shows that Japan does have a different pattern of changes in experience
differentials than do Britain and the United States. Although experience differentials increased
from the mid-i 970s to the early 1 980s for males in all three countries, experience differentials
declined both in the late 1 960s and the late 1980s in Japan. In fact, Japan is distinct among
the countries studied in having a smaller earnings gap between prime age and young males in
the late 1 980s/early 1990s than in the late 1 960s/early 1 970s,
Panel 0 graphs fixed-weighted averages of femalelmale log wage ratios for six five year
age groups covering workers aged 20 to 49 years. The different patterns of educational
attainment of men and women in Japan have led us to not adjust for educational attainment in
making these comparisons. The figure shows a fairly substantial narrowing of the gender
earnings gap among regular workers from 1976 to 1988.
Thus changes in education and gender wage differentials in Japan in the 1 980s are
qualitatively similar but much smaller in magnitude than the analogous changes in the United
States.In Japan, education differentials increased slightly overall and moderately for new
entrants. The bigger increase in educational differentials for young workers is similar to the U.S.
pattern. The reversal of a pattern of rising experience differentials to a pattern of shrinking
experience differentials by the late 1 980s is more extreme in Japan in the United States.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on wage distributions within sex-age-education cells to look
at within-group inequality measures in Japan that are similar to those we can compute for our15
other countries.
0. Changes in the Structure of Wanes in France
French data on mean wages by gender, occupation, industry and age come from the
Declarations Annuelles de Salaires DAS), which contains data for full-time workers in all private
and semi-public firms. While labor income is measured on an annual basis, it is constructed on
the basis of a fixed number of hours so that it has a straightforward transformation into an
hourly wage measure. The data have been collected annually for many years, but were available
in published form from 1976-1987. No data collection took place in 1981 or 1983, so these
years are missing from the time series. While detailed occupational data are available in the
DAS, there was a significant occupational redefinition beginning in 1984 that makes detailed
comparisons problematic. Aggregating occupations into nonmanual and manual categories
eliminates nearly all of the incompatibilities.
Data on wage distributions by sex and by sex-occupation groups for the 1967-82 and
1984-87 periods are available from two analogous data sets from the DAS. These data sets
cover all full-time workers in private and semi-public firms born in October of even numbered
years--roughly 4 percent samples of the covered working population.
Figure 6 summarizes between group changes in the French wage structure for the 1976-
87 period and within-occupation changes for the 1967-87 period. Panel A shows movements
in the nonmanual/manual differential by sex. The figure graphs fixed-weighted averages of the
differences in the log of the mean hourly wages of nonmanual and manual workers in 8 age
groups for each sex." The nonmanual/manual differential narrows from the mid 1970s
through the mid 1 98cm, with a minor uptick at the end of the sample period. This contrasts with
the British experience of a sharply rising nonrnanuat wage premium throughout the 1980s. But
16The age groups are 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, and 56-60. The fixed-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































panel B of figure 6 shows that the experience differentials for males in France increased in a
quite similar fashion to the analogous measure for British males (shown in panel B of figure 4).
Female/male log wage differentials by broad occupation (measured by fixed-weighted averages
of the male/female log hourly wage ratio for eight age groups) show a narrowing in France of
0.08 for manual and 0.09 for nonmanual workers from 1976 to 1987. Finally, panel D indicates
that within-occupation wage dispersion narrowed substantially for males from the late 1 960s
to 1980.In the 1980s, within-occupation inequality measured by the 90-10 log wage
differential expanded for professional and managerial occupations (e.g. cadres superiores) and
narrowed for manual occupations (e.g. ouvriers).
E. Differences and Similarities in Wace Structure Chanoes
The qualitative features of wage structure changes over the last twenty years in the
United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan are summarized and compared in Table 3. All
four countries shared in the common OECD pattern of declining educational and occupational
wage differentials in the 1 970s. The pattern of narrowing skill differentials reversed itself in
three of the countries by the early 1 980s and in France starting in 1984. The magnitude of
increases in skill differentials in the 1980s are largest in Britain and the United States.'7
More generally Britain and the United States show quite similar patterns of substantial
increases in between and within group wage inequality in the 1 980s. The one exception to this
pattern is that experience differentials for more-educated workers narrowed in the United States
in the 1 960s. Japan had moderate increases in inequality in the 1 980s. and France is the outlier
"Differences in education systems mean the best way to compare the magnitude of skill differential
changes in France, Britain and the United States is to examine changes in analogous occupational wage
differentials. Table A2 of the Appendix compares changes in nonmanual/manual wage differentials by
age-sex groups in Britain, France, and the United States using as comparable as possible earnings data
and occupational classification systems. Differences in the organization of work and similarities in
educational distributions for males mean that educational earnings differentials are more comparable
in the United States and Japan than are occupational wage differentials. Katz and Revenga (1989)






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with no rise in inequality through 1984. Increased wage inequality in France from 1984 to 1987
suggests wage structure changes similar to those experienced by the other countries in the early
1 980s may be occurring with a lag in France. U.S. males are the only group for whom overall
wage inequality was already increasing in the 1 970s. France and Britain share a pattern of
decreasing wage dispersion in the 1 970s. Finally, the relative earnings of females improved in
all four countries over the last twenty years, although the time patterns of the changes are fairly
heterogeneous.
IV. SupiDly and Demand Factors
We begin our investigation into the causes of the between-group relative wage changes
documented in the previous section using a simple supply and demand framework in which
different demographic groups (identified by sex, age, and education) are viewed of as distinct
labor inputs. We initially abstract from the effects of labor market institutions on wage setting
and think of the relative wages of demographic groups in each country as being generated by
the interaction of relative supplies of the groups and an aggregate production function with its
associated factor demand schedules. To the extent that different demographic groups are
imperfect substitutes in production, we can view changes in relative wages as being generated
by shifts in relative numbers of workers in each group and shifts in relative demand schedules.
Changes in the age structure and educational attainment of the population as well as changes
in female labor force participation rates may affect the wage structure by altering the relative
supplies of imperfectly substitutable groups of workers. Shifts in the structure of product
demand and skill-biased technological change are likely to affect relative labor demands. In this
section, we examine the extent to which changes in the relative numbers of workers by
education and changes in relative demands associated with industry shifts in emp!oyment can
help explain cross-country differences in relative wage changes.18
A. Relative SuoDly Changes
Much research on the U.S. wage structure concludes that substantial secular growth in
the demand for "more-educated" and "more-skilled" workers is necessary to rationalize the
persistence of substantial educational wage differentials in the face of a rapid growth in the
fraction of highly educated workers in the U.S. labor force (e.g. Bound and Johnson. 1992; and
Murphy and Welch, 1992). Freeman (1981) argues that trend growth in the relative demand
for college-educated workers is required to explain patterns of changes in the relative wages and
quantities in most OECD economies through the end of the 1 970s. Under the stark hypothesis
that the relative demand for college graduates grows at a relatively steady trend rate (perhaps
because of a steady pace of industrial shifts and technological changes favoring the more-
skilled), changes in the college wage premium should be inversely related to changes in the rate
of growth of the relative supply of college graduates. Katz and Murphy (1992) find that a simple
hypothesis of this type does a good job explaining movements in U.S. educational wage
differentials over the last thirty years. This approach suggests that differences in the rate of
growth of the supply of highly educated workers in the 1 970s and the 1 980s may help explain
a fairly general pat-tern of narrowing education differentials in the 1 970s and expanding
differentials in the 1 980s.
Table 4 provides summary information on changes in the fraction of the labor force (or
adult population) with college educations in the United States, Britain, France and Japan over
the last two decades. The rate of growth of college-educated workers was quite rapid in all four
countries in the 1 970s. The expansion of the availability of higher education and large baby•
boom cohorts fueled the furious pace of relative supply growth over this period. The rate of
growth of the relative supply of highly-educated workers decelerated substantially in the United
States. Britain, and Japan in the 1 980s. The relative earnings of university graduates declined
in each of these countries during the 1 970s when supply growth was fastest and expanded in
each of these countries in the 1 980s when supply growth was much slower. Relative supplyTable 4
Relative Supplies of College EduOated Workers in Four Countries
Group, Ages % with College Education Annual Log Growth Rates
U.S., Employees 1969 1979 1989 69—79 79—89
Males, 18—64 14.5 21.9 26.6 .041 .019
Females, 18—64 10.4 16.8 23.2 .048 .032
Males & Females, 18—64 13.0 19.9 25.1 .043 .023
u.s., Population
Males, 18—64 13.8 19.8 24.0 .036 .019
Females, 18—64 8.3 13.5 19.2 .049 .035
Males & Females, 18—64 10.8 16.6 21.5 .043 .026
0.8., Population 1973 1979 1989 73—79 79—89
Males, 16—60 9.6 14.5 21.0 .069 .037
Females, 16—60 6.5 9.6 13.9 .065 .037
Males & Females, 16-60 8.0 12.0 17.4 .068 .037
G.E., Employees
Males, 16—60 10.1 15.7 23.9 .074 .042
Females, 16—60 7.7 10.8 17.4 .056 .048
Males & Females, 16—60 9.1 13.6 21.0 .068 .037
France, Population 1970 1980 1989 70—80 80—89
Males, 15+ 5.3 8.3 11.8 .045 .039
Females, 15+ 5.3 6.9 10.4 .026 .046
France, Labor Force 1968 1982 1987 68—82 82—87
Males, 15+ 4.3 10.1 13.2 .061 .054
Males & Females, 15+ 3.8 10.9 14.0 .075 .050
Japan, Regular Employees 1970 1979 1990 70—79 79—90
Males, All 11.1 18.9 25.1 .059 .026
Japan, All Employees 1971 1979 1987 71—79 79—87
Males, 15+ 15.1 21.0 25.6 .041 .025
Males & Females, 15+ 12.0 17.9 22.5 .050 .02924
workers. The estimates also indicate that the sharp contrast in thelabor market performance
of less-educated young workers in Britain in the 1 970s and I 980smay be associated with its
particularly sharp acceleration in the pace of deindustrialization in theearly 1 980s.
Since educational earnings differentials expanded andgender earnings differentials
narrowed in each of these countries in the 1 980s, the actual between-sectordemand shifts that
would have occurred at fixed relative factor prices are likely to begreater than those suggested
in Table 6- Additionally, the use of highly aggregate one-digitindustry categories is likely to lead
us to understate the magnitude of between-industry relative demand shifts. Whenwe use two-
digit industry data for Japan and the United States, we find that relativedemand shifts across
education-gender groups have a similar pattern to the one-digit estimatespresented in Table 6
but are almost twice as large in magnitude.
In summary, simple supply and demand factorsappear to go a reasonable difference
towards explaining differences in changes in thewage structure across time periods and
countries. A significant slowdown in the growth rate of the relativesupply of college graduates
occurred in the United States, Britain, and Japan. This reduction in thepace of the growth of
the supply of highly educated workers combined withsteady demand growth favoring such
workers provides a consistent explanation for declining educationdifferentials in the 1 970s and
a rapid growth of education differentials in the 1 980s in Britain and theUnited States. An
acceleration in the pace of between- and within-industry demand shiftsalso appears in these two
countries with massive increases in wage inequality in the 1 980s.France's stable skill
differentials may relate to a continuation of a rapid growth of therelative supply of highly-
educated workers in the 1 980s. Nevertheless, the much earlierappearance of rising inequality
in the United States than the other three countries andthe extent to which France's wage
structure behaved differently than the others in the 1 980s dosuggest that differences in labor
market institutions may play a major role in explaining differentialresponses of national wage
structures to common relative skill demand shifts.19
growth slowed down in the 1 980s in these three countries both when measured as the annual
average change in the log share of college graduates and when measured aà the annual average
change in the percentage share of college graduates.
Under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution between college and non-college
workers in the United States is in Freeman's (1986) preferred 1-3 range, the slowdown in the
rate of growth of college graduates in the United States from the 1 970s to the 1 980s can
explain an increase in the college/high school log wage differential from 1979 to 1989 of 0.06
to 0.20. In fact, the U.S. college/high school log wage ratio for all males (panel A of figure 3)
increased by 0-14 from 1979 to 1989. If the degree of substitutability of college and other
workers is at the low end of existing estimates, then changes In the rate of growth of the
relative supply of college workers in the 1 980s are sufficient by themselves to explain observed
increases in the college wage premium in the United States. Britain, and Japan. Thus
differences in the rate of growth of the relative supply of highly educated workers in the 1 970s
and 1 980s may be an important part of the explanation for declining skill differentials in the
1 970s and rising skill differentials in the 1 980s.
Table 4 further indicates that the one country in which education/occupation differentials
do not appear to have expanded in the 1 980s, France, is also the country in which the log
relative supply growth of college graduates remained the greatest in the 1 980s. The evidence
for a deceleration in log relative supply growth in France in the 1 980s is somewhat ambiguous.
One gets different answers for choices of slightly different years and different samples (e.g. the
adult population versus the adult labor force).
B. Relative Demand Shifts
It is clear that substantial shifts in relative demand favoring more-educated and more-
skilled workers are necessary to explain patterns of changes in wage structures in most OECD
countries over the post-war period. One explanation for patterns of changes in education/skill20
differentials is that relative demand for more-educated workers has grown fairly steadily and that
variations in changes in skill differentials across periods are driven by changes in the rate of
growth of relative supply. This explanation is fairly consistent with the observed time-series for
the United States under the assumption of fairly low substitutability between college and less-
educated workers. But the 1 980s deceleration in therate of growth of relative supply of college
graduates is many countries is not a sufficient explanation for the observed increases in
educational wage differentials if the degree of substitutability is in the high range of plausible
estimates. Furthermore, sharp increases in experience differentials for less-educated workers
in the early 1980s, a period of small entering cohorts of less-educated workers, do not seem to
fit into a picture of smooth changes in relative skill demands throughout the last twenty years.
An alternative set of explanations focuses on an acceleration in the rate of growth of relative
demand for more-skilled workers possibly arising from an increased pace of technological
changes, foreign outsourcing of production jobs, or the decline of the manufacturing sector.
We find it useful to think of relative demand shifts as coming from two types of changes:
those that occur within industries (i.e., shifts that change relative factor ratios at fixed relative
factor prices) and those that occur between industries (i.e.. shifts that change the allocation of
labor demand across industries at fixed relative wages). Sources of within-industry shifts include
skill-biased technological change, outsourcing, and changes in the prices of nonlabor inputs (e.g.
computers). Between-industry shifts may be driven by shifts in product demand across
industries, differences across industries in factor-neutral technological change, and shifts in net
international trade.
The finding that the share of employment of college graduates and women increased
inside almost every two-digit industry in the United States from 1963-87 despite increases in
the relative prices of college graduates and females suggests important shifts in relative demand
have occurred within detailed industries (Katz and Murphy, 1992). These changes in relative
demand for more-educated and nonproduction workers appear to have accelerated in the 1 980s21
(Berman, Bound, and Griliches, 1992). Similar changes in factor ratios within one-digit industries
are apparent in our examination of British data from the Labour Force Survey for the 1980s.
Thus an increased pace of within-sector skill upgrading in a period of rising relative prices of
more-skilled workers suggests that an acceleration in within-industry relative demand growth
plays some role in rising wage inequality in the 1 980s.
The effects of between-industry shifts in labor demand on the relative demands for
different skill and demographic groups depends on group differences in Industrial employment
distributions. Shifts in industrial employment will shift relative labor demands if sectors differ
in their intensity of use of different types of workers. The data we have available for the United
States, Britain4 and Japan all indicate that input coefficients for different education groups and
for men and women differ systematically across industries in a similar manner in each country.
Less-educated workers are over-represented in agriculture, construction, mining, and many
manufacturing sectors. College graduates are over-represented in professional and related
services, finance, insurance and real estate, and some high technology manufacturing sectors.
Major industrial employment shifts in each country are illustrated in Table 5. France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States all experienced a sharp decline in the share of
employment in goods-producing industries (mining, manufacturing, construction, and utilities)
in the 1970s and the 1 980s. These employment shifts are likely to have led to a shift in relative
demand against less-skilled workers. The relative decline of employment in goods-producing
industries over the entire period was comparable in the United States and France, but was
significantly larger in the United Kingdom. Japan is an outlier in the other direction: it maintained
a stable share of employment in manufacturing throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The shifts
illustrated in Table 5 suggest an acceleration in the pace of between-industry demand shifts
against the less-skilled in the 1 980s in Britain and France. The broad changes in the industrial
distribution of employment in each of the four countries also are likely to have favored women
over men.Table 5
Sectoral Employment shares,1965—89
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989
1) UNITED STATES
Agriculture 6.3 4.5 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.9
Industry 35.5 34.4 30.6 30.5 28.0 26.7
Services 58.2 61.1 65.3 65.9 68.8 70.5
2) GREAT BRITAIN
Agriculture 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.2
Industry 46.6 44.7 40.4 37.7 31.6 29.3
Services 49.6 52.0 56.8 59.7 65.9 68.5
3) JAPAN
Agriculture 23.5 17.4 12.7 10.4 8.8 7.6
Industry 32.4 35.7 35.9 35.3 34.9 34.3
Services 44.1 46.9 51.5 52.4 56.4 58.2
4) FRANCE
Agriculture 17.8 13.5 10.3 8.7 7.6 6.4
Industry 39.1 39.2 38.6 35.9 32.0 30.1
Services 43.1 47.2 51.1 55.4 60.4 63.5
Source: OECD, Labour Force Statietics.22
We next attempt to more systematically determine whether changes in the industrial
composition of employment led to an acceleration in the rate of decline in relative demand for
less-educated workers in the 1 980s. We use standard fixed-coefficient relative demand shift
indices to measure how changes in the industrial mix of jobs in the United States, Britain, and
Japan have affected the relative demand for workers by sex-education categories in the I 970s
and in the I 980s. We specify an index of the demand for the labor of the jth group of workers
in year t as
(1) =
whereis total empcyment in industry i in year t and ; is the fixed coefficient relating the
number of workers in group j to total employment in industry i under fixed technology and fixed
relative factor prices. Since we are concerned with changes in relative demands, we normalize
both sides of equation (1) by dividing through by aggregate employment at time t CEjto yield
the index of the relative demand for group j given by
(2) e = a e
where e, = E1,/E, and e = E,iE1.Wemeasure the log change in the relative demand for group
as Aln(ej. This approach to measuring relative demand shifts arising from sectoral employment
shifts can either be justified as a fixed-coefficients "manpower requirementC index (Freeman.
1986) or as an approximation to "true" factor demand shifts for more general production
functions (Katz and Murphy, 1 992).
To implement this approach to measuring demand shifts in as comparable a manner as
possible in different countries, we divide the economies of each country into nine one-digit
industries and divide the labor forces into six to eight sex-education grOups. We use separate23
estimates of the c,'s for each country. We measure 0q as group i's share of totalemployment
in sector i in a base period. We measure changes in industrial employmentshares (changes
in e,1's) for each country on a comparable basis using the one-digit industrialemployment
distributions reported by the OECD (OECD, 1991). Although important industrial shiftsoccurring
within one-digit industries are missed by our measure of between-industry demandshifts, this
approach does provide a way to gauge differences across countries and time periods inthe
extent that broad changes in industry mix have affected the relative demands for different
groups of workers.
Table 6 presents changes in our relative demand shift measures over the 1969-79and
1979-99 periods for eight demographic groups in the United States and sixdemographic groups
in Britain and Japan.1' Measured between-industry demand shifts aremonotonically increasing
for both men and women in all three countries in both time periods. Between-industryshifts also
favored women relative to men in every education group for all three countries. Themagnitude
of demand shifts against less-educated workers increased in Britain in the 1980s,appears fairly
steady across the two decades in the United States, and decreases in Japan in the 1980s. The
large magnitude of the relative demand shifts in Japan in the 1 970s are driven by thesharp
decline in agriculture's share of employment. Japan's strength in manufacturing inthe 1980s
meant a smaller between-industry shift in relative labor demand against high school (upper
secondary) males in Japan than in Britain or the United States. Overall the between-industry
shifts are consistent with a pattern of trend increases in the relative demand forhighly-educated
"The base period in each country was chosen so that theui's would reflect average production
technologies in the 1 980s. The base years for each country are 1979, 1984, and 1989 for the United
States; 1 979, 1983, 1987, and 1989 for Britain; and 1979 and 1987 for Japan. Experimentation with
U.S. data indicate that estimated shifts in relative labor demands are notvery sensitive to the choice
of base year over the 1967 to 1989 period. The cd's were calculated using dataon employment
status, industry, education, and sex from household surveys in each country: the CI'S Outgoing
Rotation Groups in the United States; the Labour Force Survey for Britain; and theEmployment Status
Survey for Japan.
19Unfortunately we do not have the necessary data to calculate analogous measures for France.TabLe 6
Industry Based Demand Shift Measures, 1969—1989
Change in log relative demand
Males Females
Education Group 69—79 79—89 69—79 79—89
1) UNITED STATES
Drop Outs —.044 —.048 —.003 —.009
High School Graduates -.036 —.041 .023 .025
Some College -.011 —.012 .046 .047
College Graduates .016 .019 .051 .054
2)GREATBRITAIN
No qualifications -.072 —.097 .028 .000
A—levels, 0—levels etc. -.039 —.041 .069 .084
college .026 .059 .102 .119
3)JAPAN
Lower secondary —.066 —.057 —.128 —.054
Upper secondary .035 .007 .032 .028
college .098 .054 .107 .073
Note: The between industry demand shift measure for group j is given by Aln(e3t)
where ej —S1 a; oj is greup i's share of total employment in sector I in
the base period, and et is industry i's share of total employment in year t.i
indexes9one—digitindustries for the United States and Japan and B one—digit
industries for Britain.24
workers. The estimates also indicate that the sharp contrast in thelabor market performance
of less-educated young workers in Britain in the 1 970s and I 980smay be associated with its
particularly sharp acceleration in the pace of deindustrialization in theearly 1 980s.
Since educational earnings differentials expanded andgender earnings differentials
narrowed in each of these countries in the 1 980s, the actual between-sectordemand shifts that
would have occurred at fixed relative factor prices are likely to begreater than those suggested
in Table 6- Additionally, the use of highly aggregate one-digitindustry categories is likely to lead
us to understate the magnitude of between-industry relative demand shifts. Whenwe use two-
digit industry data for Japan and the United States, we find that relativedemand shifts across
education-gender groups have a similar pattern to the one-digit estimatespresented in Table 6
but are almost twice as large in magnitude.
In summary, simple supply and demand factorsappear to go a reasonable difference
towards explaining differences in changes in thewage structure across time periods and
countries. A significant slowdown in the growth rate of the relativesupply of college graduates
occurred in the United States, Britain, and Japan. This reduction in thepace of the growth of
the supply of highly educated workers combined withsteady demand growth favoring such
workers provides a consistent explanation for declining educationdifferentials in the 1 970s and
a rapid growth of education differentials in the 1 980s in Britain and theUnited States. An
acceleration in the pace of between- and within-industry demand shiftsalso appears in these two
countries with massive increases in wage inequality in the 1 980s.France's stable skill
differentials may relate to a continuation of a rapid growth of therelative supply of highly-
educated workers in the 1 980s. Nevertheless, the much earlierappearance of rising inequality
in the United States than the other three countries andthe extent to which France's wage
structure behaved differently than the others in the 1 980s dosuggest that differences in labor
market institutions may play a major role in explaining differentialresponses of national wage
structures to common relative skill demand shifts.25
V. The Role of Labor Market Institutions
The much different behavior of the pattern of relative wages in France than in the other
three countries in the 1 980s in a period of substantial industrial employment shifts in France
does point to the possibility that French labor market institutions somewhat offset the effects
of relative demand shifts on skill differentials. The outstanding features of the French wage data
are that differentials across occupational groups failed to increase substantially in the 1 980s,
wage inequality did not increase significantly overall or within most groups, and real incomes
grew substantially, particularly for manual workers.
There are two important and inter-related labor market institutions that may help explain
why relative demand shifts led to only quite modest relative wage changes in France: the
collective bargaining system and the minimum wage. Collective bargaining in France has taken
place mainly at the industry level since 1 950, when a law was passed favoring industry-level
bargaining between national employers' federations and national unions. Accordingly, the four
large unions in France, and a few smarler ones, are organized on an industry basis. There are
no majority representation criteria as in the United States. The French unions have authority to
bargain collectively on behalf of the employees in an industry, even though only a small portion
of the employees are members of any particular union. Under the terms of the law, industry-
level agreements may be extended by the Minister of Labor to all firms in the industry even those
that are not members of the employers' federation.
French workers are not obliged to join unions to receive the benefits of negotiated
agreements. Since dues are collected on an individual basis and are not deducted automatically
by the employer, membership statistics are poor, and the unions must make estimates based on
total dues revenues. Nonetheless, it is clear that union density has fallen significantly, from
roughly 24 percent in the 1 970s to less than 15 percent in the late 1 980s. The membership of
the most militant union, Confederation Generale du Travail, is estimated to have dropped by
more that 60 percent from 1976 to 1987 (Bridgford, 1990).26
The membership figures, however, do not accurately portray union influence. Support for
the unions is better measured by their candidates' success in elections for positionson industrial
tribunals and enterprise committees.2° While the percentage of votes cast for unioncandidates
has declined since the 1970s, Bridgford (1990) reports that they still receive nearly fiftypercent
of the votes for industrial tribunals and nearly eighty percent of the votes forenterprise
committees. Moreover, industry-level agreements negotiated by the unions andemployer
federations are routinely extended to all firms in the industry, so that unions exert significant
influence on the terms and conditions of employment throughout most industries. Data from
1981 show that nearly eighty percent of all firms, and nearly ninety percent of all workerswere
covered by industry-level agreements (Eyraud and Tchobanian, 1985; and Cairo, 1984). The
industry-level agreements determine minimum wages for each job category. Companiesmay,
and often do, chose to pay more, especially for the more highly skilled jobs, but thenegotiated
minima represent a constraint that applies to firms of all sizes throughout an industry.2'
The second key labor market institution is the legislated minimum wage, or SMIC (salaire
minimum interprofessional de croissance). The SMIC, which applies to essentially all sectors
with few exemptions or abatements, is a very considerable constraint on thewages of the young
or less-skilled, Begun in 1950 when wartime wage controls were lifted, the 5Mb is adjusted
automatically for inflation, and occasionally changed in real terms by the federal government.
Indeed, the legislation enacting the SMIC referred to it not as a subsistence wage, but rather as
a social policy tool intended to help poorly paid workers share in economic growth (OECD,
1985). Brazen and Martin (1991) estimate that 12 percent of all wage and salary earners were
paid at or below the SMIC in 1 987 and that this percentage had risen significantly since the
I 970s. Only about 5 percent of all U.S. wage and salary workers were paid at or below the
20lndustrial tribunals hear claims of unjust and illegal actions by employers against employees.
Enterprise committees are responsible for social activities and labor-management consultation.
21hence, large firms typically cannot significantly reduce labor costs by sub-contracting to small
producers,27
Federal minimum wage of ($3.35 per hour) or less in 1988, and this fraction had declined
significantly since 1981 (Haugen and MelIor, 1990). The SMIC has been at least 60% of the
mean wage since 1978, and has actually increased significantly since then in terms of the mean
wage (Katz and Loveman, 1990). Figure 7 shows that the SMIC has also increased relative to
wages for unskilled workers for the past twenty years. The increase was most dramatic in the
early 1 980s, when wage differentials were rising sharply in the United States and Britain and
starting to rise in Japan. An especially sharp rise in the SMIC in the early 1980s followed the
election of the Socialists in 1981. The Socialist government pursued an economic policy that
featured increases in the SMIC as a means of increasing purchasing power for lower income
workers. From July 1 980s to July 1984, the government increased the SMIC in real terms by
14 percent, while average real hourly wages rose by just over 6 percent.
These substantial relative increases in the SMIC tightened wage differentials at the lower
end of the distribution. We estimate using our data on French earnings distributions from the
DAS that from 1979 to 1987 the SMIC increased from 45.7 to 53.3 percent of the median
earnings and from 73.3 to 84.4 percent of the tenth percentile earnings of full-time French male
employees. In fact, from 1967 to 1987, the SMIC increased from 75 to 101 percent of the
10th percentile hourly earnings of full-time female workers in the DAS sample. In contrast, the
U.S. Federal minimum wage remained fixed at a nominal value of $3.35 per hour from 1981 to
1990 and declined in real and relative value throughout the 1 980s. We use our March CPS
wage samples to estimate that the U.S. minimum wage declined over the 1979 to 1987 period
from 40.1 to 30.3 percent of the median and from 82.3 to 69.7 percent of the tenth percentile
hourly wage of male, full-time employees in the United States. The SMIC appears to have
helped prevent a sharp erosion of real wages at the low end of the French wage distribution.
When the SMIC does not bind on the wages of the less-skilled, the industry-negotiated
minima do. In some industries the base (minimum) wage is set equal to the SMIC, while in



















SMIC shift the entire wage distribution. The potential influence of unions and the SMIC on
wages in the lower half of the French earnings distribution is highlighted in Table 7 which shows
three measures of overall wage inequality for our four countries for selected years from 1979
to 1989. The table indicates that the bottom half of the French wage distribution for men (as
measured by the log wage gap between the 50th and 10th percentiles) is much more
compressed relative to the top half (as measured by the log wage gap between the 90th and
50th percentiles) than in the other three countries. The 50-10 differential narrowed a bit for
both French men and women in the period of the rapid rise in the value of the SNUG from 1979
to 1 984, while the 50-10 gap was rising for both sexes in the United States and Britain and for
men in Japan.
While negotiated and legislated minima have maintained the relative wages of the less
skilled with jobs, the employment prospects for young, less-skilled people deteriorated sharply.
In 1984, youth unemployment in France was 26 percent, compared to 15 percent in the seven
major industrial OECD countries. Likewise, the duration of unemployment in France was much
longer than in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.22 While one must be
cautious in drawing conclusions concerning the effects of the SMIC on the employment of youth
and the less-skilled from simple time series patterns, Brazen and Martin (1991) provide some
(weak) evidence suggestive of moderate adverse effects of the SMIC on youth employment in
France in the early 1 980s.
The DAS wage data suggest that there may have been a slight increase in French wage
inequality, both within and between groups, since 1984. The Auroux reforms in 1982 began
a process of change in French industrial relations that favors enterprise or plant-level negotiations
over industry-wide negotiations. The reforms require unions and firms to negotiate wages and
other matters annually, but they do not require the completion of an agreement. As this
legislation matured during the 1 980s, negotiations over substantive issues, including wages,
"See OECD (1985).Table 7
Alternative Measures of Wage Inequality for Four Countries, 1979—1990
1979 1984 1987 1990
a) HALES
90/10
US 1.23 1.36 1.38 1.40
GB 0.88 1.04 1.10 1.16
France 1.19 1.18 1.22
Japan 0.95 1.02 1.01 1.04
90/50
US 0.56 0.66 0.68 0.69
GB 0.51 0.61 0.63 0.67
France 0.72 0.73 0.76
Japan 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.55
50/10
US 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.71
GB 0.37 0.43 0.47 0.49
France 0.47 0.45 0.46
Japan 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50
b) FEMALES
90/10
Us 0.96 1.16 1.23 1.27
GB 0.84 0.98 1.02 1.11
France 0.96 0.93 1.00
Japan 0.78 0.79 0.84 0.83
90/50
US 0.55 0.63 0.61 0.67
GB 0.50 0.58 0.59 0.64
France 0.53 0.52 0.54
Japan 0.43 0.45 0.50 0.49
50/10
US 0.41 0.53 0.63 0.61
GB 0.34 0.41 0.43 0.47
France 0.44 0.41 0.46
Japan 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35
Notes: 90/10 refers to the log wage differential between the 90th and 10th
percentile workers. The 90/50 and 50/10 differentials are defined analogous—
ly.The wage inequality measures refer to log hourly wages for the U.S.,
Great Britain and France, and to log monthly scheduled wages for Japan.29
have become increasingly decentralized, but agreements remain largely at the industry level.
These changes have moved France closer to the U.S. model of low union membership and
decentralized negotiations, and may have played a role in the modest increases in wage
inequality since the mid 1 980s.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has examined similarities and differences in patterns of changes in the structure
of wages in the United States, Britain, Japan and France over the last twenty years. Educational
and occupational wage differentials narrowed in all four countries in the 1 970s. This pattern
reversed itself with increases in skill differentials in the United States, Britain, and Japan in the
early 1 980s and a muted but somewhat similar pattern appears to emerge in France starting in
1984.
Reductions in the rate of the growth of the relative supply of college-educated workers
in the face of persistent increases in the relative demand for more-skilled labor can explain a
substantial portion of the increase in educational wage differentials in the United States. Britain,
and Japan in the 1 980s. The earlier appearance of rising overall wage inequality in the United
States than in Britain may reflect the power of British unions to oppose the apparently market-
driven forces that contributed to rising overall wage inequality among males in the United States
in the 1 970s. The more severe increases in skill differentials in Britain and the United States than
in Japan can be partially attributed to an acceleration in the rate of growth of the demand for
more-skilled workers in the 1 980s associated with industrial employment shifts out of
manufacturing and within sector skill upgrading. Similar changes in relative skill demands are
likely to have occurred in France, but the effect of such changes on wages has been somewhat
offset by a high minimum wage and the ability of French unions to extend contracts even in the
face of declining membership.30
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Data Source I: Annual Demographic Files, March Current Population Survey (CI'S), 1964-
90.
Earnings Concept: Hourly wage Cannual earnings divided by annual hours) in the year prior
to the survey. Annual hours are given by the product of annual weeks worked and usual weekly
hours.
Wage Sample: Full-time workers, 18-64 years old. The wage sample excludes those in
the military, students, agricultural workers, without-pay workers, those that worked less than
13 weeks in the previous year, wage-salary workers with self-employment income, the
unincorporated self-employed, and those with allocated income.
Quantity Sample for Measuring Weeks Worked by Different Groups: Excludes those in
military, students, agricultural workers, and without-pay workers.
Remarks: Adjustments for top coding, bracketed weeks and hours variables, changes in
the CPS imputation procedures in 1976 are as in Murphy and Welch (1992).Potential
experience is measured as age at the survey date minus years of completed schooling minus 7.
Data Source II: Outgoing Rotation Groups, CPS, all twelve months, 1979-91.
Earnings Concept: Hourly wage (usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours) at
current job-
Wage Sample: Full-time workers, 18-64 years old. Excludes the self-employed, workers
with allocated (imputed) earnings, and those with reported hourly wages of less than $2.00 or
more than $100.00 in 1991 dollars.
Remarks: Top coded earnings are adjusted upward by a multiplicative factor of 1.36.
Earnings from the unedited usual weekly earnings fields with a higher nominal top code are used
to measure weekly earnings for workers with top coded edited earnings in the 1986-88 surveys.
GREAT BRITAIN
Data Source I: New Earnings Survey (NES), published volumes for 1968 and 1970-91.
Earnings Concept: Gross hourly earnings.
Wage Sample: Full-time employees, 21 or older for males and 18 or older for females,
whose pay was not affected by absence during the survey period.
Remarks: The NES is a sample survey of the earnings of employees in employment in
Great Britain in April of each year. It covers a one-percent random sample of employees who
are members of pay-as-you-earn income tax schemes, and is designed to represent all categories
of employees in businesses of all kinds and sizes.
Data Source /1: General Household Survey (GHS), 1973-90.
Earnings Concept: Gross weekly earnings.
Wage Sample: Full-time employees, 16-69 years old.
Remark: A CPS-style household survey of 10 to 15 thousand households per year.
Data Source Ill: Labour Force Surveys (LFS), 1979-1990.
Earnings Concept: No earnings information is collected.
Remark: A large CPS-style household survey that does not collect wage information but
is quite useful for the measurement of relative quantities of different types of workers in total
employment and by industry.33
JAPAN
Data Source I: Basic Survey on Wage Structure, published tabulations, 1967-90.
EarningsConcept: Monthlyscheduled earnings.
Wage Sample: Regular workers, 1 8-59 years old, at non-governmental establishments with
at least 5-10 regular workers (varies by survey year). Excludes agriculture, forestry and
fisheries, private household services and employees of foreign governments.
Remarks: 70,000 to 100,000 establishments are surveyed in a typical year. The sample
excluded the service sector prior to 1973.
Data Source II: Employment Status Survey, published tabulations, 1971-1987.
Earnings Concept: A continuous individual earnings measure is not available.
Remark: A large national household survey that is useful for measuring quantities. It
covers a broader spectrum of workers than does the Basic Survey on Wage Structure.
FRANCE
Data Source: Tabulations from the Declarations Annuelles de Salaires (DAS).
Earnings Concept: Gross annual earnings adjusted for differences among individuals in
annual hours worked.
Wage Sample: Full-time, full-year workers in private and semi-public firms.Table Al
Comparative Overview: U.S., Great Britain, France and Japan
(annual growth rates from preceding to current period)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989
1)UNITED STATES
Real GNP (1965=1) 1 1.16 1.30 1.53 1.72 1.94
(3.0) (2.3) (3.3) (2.3) (3.0)
Population, 15—64 116.6127.0 138.9 150.8 158.8 163.9
years (millions) (1.7) (1.8) (1.6) (1.0) (0.8)
Civilian Empt. (millions) 71.1 78.7 85.6 99.3 101.2 117.3
(1.9)(1.7)(3.0)(1.5) (2.3)
Civilian labor force 74.5 82.8 93.7 106.9 115.5 123.9
(millions) (2.1) (2.5) (2.6) (1.5) (1.8)
Unemployment rate —all 4.4 4.8 8.3 7.0 7.1 5.2
Unemp. rate, 16—24 years 9.1 9.9 15.2 13.3 13.0 10.5
2) GREATBRITAIN
RealGNP (1965=1) 1 1.13 1.27 1.37 1.49 1.73
(2.4) (2.3) (1.5) (1.7) (3.7)
Population, 15—64 35.0 35.0 35.2 36.1 37.2 37.5
years (millions) (0.0) (0.1) (0.5) (0.6) (0.2)
Civilian Empt. (millions) 24.8 24.4 24.7 25.0 24.2 26.0
(—0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (—0.7) (1.8)
Civilian labor force 25.1 24.9 25.6 26.5 27.5 27.8
(millions) (—0.1) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.3)
Unemployment rate —all 1.2 2.2 3.9 6.5 12.4 6.3
Unemp. rte, 16—24 years — 2.8 8.7 13.5 21.8 n/aTable Al: continued
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989
3) JAPPJ4
RealGDP (l9651) 1 1.79 2.27 2.95 3.56 4.24
(11.6) (4.8) (5.2) (3.8) (4.4)
PopulatiOn, 15—64 66.6 71.6 75.6 78.7 82.3 85.5
years (millions) (1.4) (1.1) (0.8) (0.9) (1.0)
civilian Empt. (milLions) 47.3 50.9 52.2 55.4 58.1 61.3
1.5) (0.5) (1.2) (1.0)(1.3)
civilianlabor force 47.9 51.5 53.2 56.5 59.6 62.7
(millions) (1.4) (0.6) (1.2) (1.1) (1.3)
Unemployment rate —all 0.9 1.1 1.9 2.0 2.6 2.2
Unemp. rate, lS—24yrs 1.3 2.0 3.0 3.6 4.8 4.5
4) FRMCE
Real 00? (1965=1) 1 1.30 1.58 1.86 1.97 2.24
(5.2) (3.9) (3.3)(1.1)(3.2)
Population,15—64 30.4 31.6 33.0 34.3 36.3 37.0
years (millions) (0.8) (0.9) (0.8) (1.1) (0.5)
Civilian Empt. (millions) 19.5 20.3 20.9 21.3 20.9 21.5
(0.9) (0.6) (0.4) (—0.4) (0.7)
Civilianlabor force 19.8 20.9 21.7 22.8 23.4 23.8
(millions) (1.0) (0.9) (0.9) (0.5) (0.4)
Unemployment rate —aLl 1.5 1.8 3.8 6.0 10.1 9.5
Unemp. rate 15—24 years — 3.2 7.9 15.0 25.6 19.1
Sources: OEcD, Labour Force Statistics; and OECD, quarterly National Acocunts.Table A2






Male 21—24 0.143 0.268 0.298 0.352
25—29 0.225 0.344 0.380 0.391
30-39 0.288 0.380 0.430 0.440
40-49 0.305 0.392 0.428 0.496
50—59 0.344 0.365 0.41 6 0.473
Female 21—24 0.019 0.148 0.194 0.206
25—29 0.101 0.198 0.261 0.320
30—39 0.266 0.318 0.354 0.411
40-49 0.347 0.419 0.449 0.492
50—59 0.385 0.426 0.467 0,545
Great Britain
Male 21—24 0.063 0.116 0.155 0.222
25—29 0.247 0.290 0.341 0.402
30—39 0.400 0.454 0.503 0.562
40—49 0.464 0.536 0.581 0.647
50—59 0.457 0.533 0.576 0.610
Female 21—24 0.139 0.225 0.215 0.305
25—29 0.295 0.357 0.377 0.461
30—39 0.301 0.435 0,460 0.578
40—49 0.305 0.395 0.396 0.531
50—59 0.296 0.401 0.430 0.513
France
Male 21—25 0.153 0.159 0.146
26—30 0.343 0.327 0.344
31—35 0.529 0.446 0.457
36—40 0.666 0.598 0.563
41—45 0.705 0.690 0.690
46—50 0.746 0.702 0.714
51—55 0.776 0.726 0.717
56—60 0.789 0.854 0.841
Female 21—25 0.224 0.215 0.194
26—30 0.315 0.302 0.294
31 —35 0.379 0.346 0.325
36—40 0.413 0.401 0.368
41—45 0,420 0.423 0.424
46-50 0.430 0.398 0.411
51-56 0.449 0.410 0.403
56-60 0.451 0.434 0.443
Note: The reported numbers are the logs of the ratio of the mean hourly wages of full-time nonmanual
and manual workers in each age-sex group. The U.S. data are from the CPS Outgoing Rotation
Groups, the British data are from the NES, and the French data are from the DAS.